INTERNET INDECENCY, INTERNATIONAL CENSORSHIP, AND SERVICE PROVIDERS\u27 LIABILITY by Konkel, Mark
NYLS Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 
Volume 19 
Number 3 Volume 19 Number 3 2000 Article 5 
2000 
INTERNET INDECENCY, INTERNATIONAL CENSORSHIP, AND 
SERVICE PROVIDERS' LIABILITY 
Mark Konkel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/
journal_of_international_and_comparative_law 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Konkel, Mark (2000) "INTERNET INDECENCY, INTERNATIONAL CENSORSHIP, AND SERVICE PROVIDERS' 
LIABILITY," NYLS Journal of International and Comparative Law: Vol. 19 : No. 3 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_international_and_comparative_law/vol19/iss3/
5 
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been 




AND SERVICE PROVIDERS' LIABILITY
I. INTRODUCTION
Ironically, Felix Somm's conviction troubled even his prosecutors.'
Somm was the Managing Director of CompuServe Deutscheland Gmbh
("CompuServe Germany"), a large Internet Service Provider ("ISP") which
operated as a subsidiary of CompuServe USA. 2 In late 1997,' the Local
Court of Munich charged that Somm intentionally provided German Internet
users with access to "violent, child, and animal pornographic
representations"4 and to three computer games that, because of their violent
content, were banned under German law.' According to the Local Court,
German Internet users were able to procure the illegal material, which had
been stored in newsgroups,6 via Internet access provided by CompuServe
Germany. Thus, although CompuServe Germany "was not technically able
to block [the] newsgroups in question,"8 the Local Court charged that Somm
i. Prosecutors in the case of Felix Somm themselves, in fact, "swung over to the view that
Somm was not liable.., and had called for him to be acquitted." Prosecutors Have Change
of Heart in Internet Case, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 4, 1998, at A 16. See also Prosecutors
Appeal German CompuServe Porn Conviction, NETWORK BRIEFING, June 4, 1998, at 1.
2. See Hans-Werner Moritz, Pornography Prosecution in Germany Rattles ISPs, NAT'L
L.J., Dec. 14, 1998, at B7.
3. See id.
4. Judgment of the Local Court Munich in the Criminal Case Versus Somm, Felix Bruno,
(visited Mar. 10, 2000) translated at <http://www.cyber-rights.org/isps/somm-dec.htm>, 11. 1.
A full copy of the actual decision in German is viewable in Adobe Acrobat format at
<http://www.jura.uni-wuerzburg.de/sieber/somm/somm-urteil.pdf> (visited Mar. 10, 2000).
5. See id. at IV.2.
6. "[N]ewsgroups, or discussion groups as they are often labeled these days, consist of
people discussing various issues. Similar to email lists, newsgroups cover a wide variety of
interests.... [N]ewsgroups are broadcast for anyone to read." Greg Notess, On the Net, 4
ONLINE 22, at 74. Data can be posted and archived in newsgroups in the form of text,
images, or other data files. Id.
7. See Somm, supra note 4, at IV. 1.
8. Id. at If. 1.
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and the corporation he managed had violated German criminal9 and civil1"
laws by "assist[ing] in the dissemination of pornographic writings"" and
negligently failing to block access to the censored games."1
What made these grave charges particularly disconcerting was what
Felix Somm did not do: he did not, of course, post the officially censored
images or games to the newsgroups. 13 Far from originating the illegal
material, Somm could not even exercise direct control over much of the
content of CompuServe's network) 4 Indeed, early in the government's
inquiry, when investigators informed Somm of the presence of the illegal
material on CompuServe's newsservers,15 Somm promptly exercised what
little content-control he could by immediately informing CompuServe USA
of the presence of the material. 6 CompuServe USA responded by closing off
all access to the newsgroups in question.17
This solution-the wholesale blocking of newsgroups in which illegal
material had appeared-could be only temporary for two reasons. First,
although some illegal material had been found in the newsgroups, those same
newsgroups also contained perfectly legal material18 to which customers
demanded immediate access.' 9 CompuServe customers in the United States
9. See id. at IV. 1.
10. See id. at IV.2. Under the Act on Publications Deemed Morally Harmful to Youth, §
3 GjS, 52 StGB, the German government produces an index of publications that are banned
for their morally harmful content. Id. In Germany, three video games accessible via
CompuServe Germany had been included in the index due to their "social-ethical
disorientation (including, but not limited to, realistically reproduced killings)." Id. at 11.2.
1I. Id. at IV.1. The illegal images were located in CompuServe newsgroups. Some of the
newsgroups in question, such as alt.sex.pedophilia, altsex.pedophilia.boys, alt.sex.
pedophilia.girls, alt.sex.incest, and alt.sex.hestia-litly.barney, would appear to be dcvotcd
entirely to illegal images. Other newsgroups, however, such as alt.sex and alt.erotica,
contained mostly legal material. Id.
12. See id. at IV.2. The games in question were Doom, Heretic, and Wolfenstein 3D. See
id.
13. This proposition, in fact, was Somm's first argument in his defense. See id. at V.
14. See id. at 11. 1. Interestingly enough, both the Local Court Munich and Somm agreed
that Somm could exercise no direct physical control over the content provided by
CompuServe USA. See also Kenneth Cukier, PSINet Sends Warning Signals to German
State, COMM. WEEK INT'L, July 20, 1998, at 16 (noting that an "ISP is powerless to prevent
users from accessing content that may be illegal under German law.").
15. See Somm, supra note 4, at 11. 1.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id. at V.
19. See Moritz, supra note 2, at B7 (stating that "[p]ublic reaction to the newsgroups'
suspension was overwhelmingly negative. Initially, CompuServe was branded a censor.").
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and Germany thus protested vociferously when the ISP limited their access
to this lawful content.2" With pressure mounting against CompuServe to
reopen the blocked newsgroups, the ISP soon restored full access.21
Second, CompuServe could not prevent the reappearance of illegal
material on its network because CompuServe users, not the ISP itself,
controlled the content of the newsgroups.22 Certainly, the storage space in
which some of the illegal data were found was technically under the physical
control of CompuServe USA.23 CompuServe Germany, however, merely
provided access to these and other newsgroups in which any "third party"
Internet user could post any material at any time, whether the user purchased
Internet access from CompuServe or not.24 With millions of Internet users
worldwide,25 CompuServe found it impossible to police its storage space
against all material that might be illegal in some jurisdiction in the world.26
Not surprisingly, then, more material banned under German law appeared
soon after the newsgroups were reopened.27
Despite this lack of control over Internet content, the Local Court of
Munich accused Somm of failing to comply with German law.28 Thus,
although Somm possessed no direct technical control over the newsgroups
and positively no control over the material posted by individuals therein, he
was convicted, fined substantially, and given a two-year suspended
sentence. 9
Traditionally, concern over the criminalization of Internet content has
been regarded as the domain of civil libertarians and others committed to free
20. See id.
21. See id. See also Somm, supra note 4, at 11. 1.
22. Somm himself made this commonsensical argument: the illegal material identified in
the indictment "[came] from third parties." Somm, supra note 4, at V. Ironically, the Local
Court also acknowledged this third-party control. See id. at 11.1.
23. See id. at 11. 1.
24. See id. Somm argued in his defense, for example, that CompuServe, "through its data
lines, allowed access [to the materials in question] which were stored in other computer
systems." Id.
25. See China: 1.18 Million SurfInternet, CHINA DAILY, July 15, 1998, at 1 (predicting 250
million Internet users worldwide by 2000).
26. See Executive ConvictedoverlnternetPorn, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST, June
25, 1998, at E2 (noting that "[sleveral experts had testified that it was not possible for an
Internet service to block all such [illegal] material.").
27. See Somm, supra note 4, at 11.1.
28. See id. at IV.1.A.3.b.
29. See id. at VI. The fine amounted to 100,000 German marks, or about $57,000. See
Executive Convicted over Internet Porn, supra note 25, at E2.
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expression online.30 The Somm case, however, starkly demonstrates a
concern for ISPs as well. Clearly, as Somm himself argued unsuccessfully,31
the Local Court of Munich misunderstood the level of control that ISPs are
able to exercise over the content available on the Internet, content generally
created by individual users, not by the ISP that provides Internet access.32 No
large ISP could ever effectively police the activities of the millions of
individual users on the Internet each day.33 Thus, CompuServe could prevent
all criminal content from appearing within its newsgroups only by blocking
access altogether.34 Such a solution, however, even if effective in keeping
out illegal material, would drive away customers: the content of a newsgroup
might be illegal in one jurisdiction, but perfectly legal and demanded by
valuable customers in another jurisdiction.35
The danger that the Somm case represents, then, has to do with an ISP's
lack of proprietary control over information appearing on the Internet. The
Internet is a large, global network, the content of which is the product of
users who could be located anywhere in the world.36 Indeed, as the U.S.
Supreme Court noted in a landmark case, "[t]he content on the Internet is as
diverse as human thought., 37 As a result, the officers of access providers like
CompuServe cannot constantly be aware of network content. 3' But when
corporate officers are held personally responsible for the acts of third parties
over whom they have no control, those officers arguably are exposed to a
kind of strict liability: they face civil and criminal penalties for acts over
30. See, e.g., Global Internet Liberty Campaign (GILC), Regardless of Frontiers:
Protecting the Human Right to Freedom of Expression on the Global Internet (visited Mar.
10, 2000) <http://www.gilc.org/speech/report>; American Civil Liberties Union (visited Mar.
10, 2000) <http:// www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/hcml.html>; Electronic Frontier Foundation
(visited Mar. 10, 2000) <http://www.eff.org>.
3 1. See Somm, supra note 4, at V.A. (arguing that Somm did not originate the material, did
not store the material on the CompuServe network, and made "every reasonable effort to
prevent the retrieval and storage of criminal content").
32. See Regardless of Frontiers, supra note 30, at 6-7 (arguing that the Internet, because
users have numerous ways of circumventing government controls, is almost entirely "user-
controlled.").
33. See China: 1.18 Million Surf Internet, supra note 25, at 1.
34. See Somm, supra note 4, at 11. 1. When, for example, alt.sex.erotica was closed, no
CompuServe user could visit the newsgroup until it was later reopened by CompuServe. Id.
35. This was true in the case of Somm, for example, where the censored games were
proscribed under German law but perfectly legal to possess and share in the United States,
where they probably originated. See Somm, supra note 4, at IV.2; see also infra Part III.A.
36. See Regardless of Frontiers, supra note 30, at A.
37. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844, 852 (1997)(citing American
Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F.Supp. 824, 842).
38. See Moritz, supra note 2, at B7; see also Somm, supra note 4, at V.B.
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which they have little, if any, actual awareness. 39 To complicate matters, no
international treaty or agreement establishes a single international standard
of liability for ISPs. 4° In order to provide access to the Internet content that
users lawfully demand, transnational ISPs must run the risk of criminal
liability in a world where many forms of expression are censored.4'
Thus, international law has yet to catch up with the market realities-and
certainly the technical realities-of the Internet. As long as there is no
international standard of protection that reflects the low level of ISP
involvement in the creation of Internet content, transnational service
providers face at least two distinct problems. First, as the Somm case makes
clear, ISPs will generally find it difficult to comply with local laws banning
certain material because an ISP cannot control the millions of users on the
Internet.42 As a result, such corporations will face a significantly greater cost
of doing business as they attempt to police information over which they have
little or no proprietary control.43 Second, and more alarmingly, transnational
ISPs will be unable to shield their officers from unwarranted criminal and
civil liability without the protection of such international standards.4' There
is a clear need for a multilateral treaty, the first of its kind,45 designed to
protect ISPs from liability for communications made by third parties.
This note proposes that a multilateral treaty regulating the level of ISP
liability for third-party acts is crucial to encouraging the development of
international commerce on the Internet. Without such international
agreement on an appropriate level of ISP liability for third-party acts,
corporations face a discouraging uncertainty in "a unique and wholly new
medium of worldwide human communication."46 Sovereign nations will, of
course, retain the power to make laws regulating the speech or other
expression of its citizens.47 One thing is certain, however: liability for
39. A perfect illustration is the Somm case itself, of course, where the Court imposed
criminal sanctions against Somm even though the Court admitted that CompuServe Germany
could not have blocked or removed the illegal material. Somm, supra note 4, at 11.1.
40. See discussion infra Part III.C.
41. See discussion infra Part 111.B.
42. See China: 1.18 Million Surf Internet, supra note 25, at 1.
43. As Somm and CompuServe argued, "in at least 99.9% of its data traffic ...
CompuServe GmbH provided access to lawful content." Somm, supra note 4, at V.B.
44. See discussion infra Part III.
45. See discussion infra Part III.
46. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844, n.4 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
47. Even international treaties designed to protect expressive rights nonetheless explicitly
recognize that individual rights to expression may be limited by the legitimate exercise of the
2000] 457
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prohibited acts of expression will threaten the viability of doing business as
an ISP in a world of differing standards for the protection of speech.48
II. THE SOMM CASE
The case against Felix Somm embodies certain misconceptions about an
ISP's control over Internet content. Uncorrected, these misconceptions will
put ISPs at risk of criminal sanctions wherever foreign jurisdictions illegalize
at least some forms of expression.49 In the Somm case, the Local Court of
Munich found Somm criminally liable for the acts of Internet users even
though he was not aware of the presence of illegal material50 and "had no
opportunity to exercise influence on the data storage device of CompuServe
USA."51 Somm and CompuServe Germany were therefore penalized for
failing to achieve the unachievable task of preventing any and all illegal
material from ever becoming available to CompuServe users in Germany.52
A. Background to the Somm Case
In November of 1995, German investigators notified Felix Somm that
several images depicting child pornography and bestiality, among other legal
pornography, had been found in CompuServe newsgroups. 3 Investigators
further alleged that they had accessed three violent war games on the
state's police power in order to protect public health, safety, or welfare. See discussion infra
Part III.C. But cf Amy Harmon, Internet Tests Boundaries of Decency and Nations
Computers: Cyberspace May be Making Laws ofAny One Country Irrelevant, ShiftingPower
From Governments, L.A. TIMES. Mar. 19, 1997. at Al (noting that legal scholars and
"crypto-anarchists" predict that "eyberspace will ultimately render the nation-state as we
know it irrelevant, with law rooted in physical control of geographic territory giving way to
new forms of governance springing from online communities").
48. Governments frequently view restriction of Internet content as important to enforcing
morality and preventing the use of Internet technology for "subversive" ends and
"antigovernment activities." See Seydou Amadou Oumarou & Rene Lefort, The Web, the
Spider, and the Fly, UNESCO COURIER, Sept. 1, 1998, at 38.
49. See id.
50. See Somm, supra note 4, at V.B.
51. Id. at IV. 1.B.2.c.aa.
52. The task is unachievable precisely because the lack of meaningful geographical
boundaries on the Internet and the resulting ability of users to post any information from any
location makes it impossible to monitor the origin or location of all material on the Internet.
See Harmon, supra note 47, at Al (arguing that the Internet is "blind to the territorial
boundaries tha have traditionally dictated legal jurisdiction.").
53. See Somm, supra note 4, at 11. 1.
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CompuServe USA network.54 Although the material was stored as data on
the CompuServe USA network, third parties could and did post data to the
network.5 Thus, the specific content available in the newsgroups was not
created or maintained by Somm, CompuServe Germany, or CompuServe
USA.56 CompuServe USA, as with any ISP, could not actually prevent users
from posting images; rather, it could only block all users' access to an entire
newsgroup which allegedly contained illegal material. 7 CompuServe
Germany had even less technical control: it solely provided individuals with
access to CompuServe USA's server.58 When investigators informed Somm
of the offending newsgroups,59 Somm took the only action he could. In
December 1995, he asked CompuServe USA to block all users' access to the
newsgroups containing illegal material, which it did.6"
CompuServe USA, however, would not block access to the newsgroups
for long. As CompuServe USA quickly discovered, there was tremendous
backlash from CompuServe users in America and elsewhere who were
prepared to take their business to another service provider if CompuServe,
by blocking an entire newsgroup, limited their access to legal expression."
In February of 1996, CompuServe USA accordingly reopened a majority of
the blocked newsgroups.62
Somm and CompuServe USA, however, did not simply abandon any
attempt to comply with German law. Rather, as noted in a letter posted to the
CompuServe network, CompuServe had made available blocking software
that would allow individual users to block their own and their children's
access to illegal material.63 In doing so, CompuServe hoped to demonstrate
both its willingness to abide by German law and its commitment to providing
54. See id. at 11.2. These games included Doom, Heretic, and Wolfenstein 3D. Id.
55. See Somm, supra note 4, at V.A.
56. See id. at IV.I.A.3.b (where the Local Court itself notes that CompuServe Germany
"does not make available for use third-party content, but only connects customers of
CompuServe USA in Germany... with the parent company." Id.
57. See Moritz, supra note 2, at B7 (observing that since "it was not technically feasible at
that time to suspend access exclusively in Germany... CompuServe Inc. was compelled to
suspend access to the newsgroups for all of its more than 4 million members globally.").
58. See Somm, supra note 4, at IV.I.B.2.a.
59. See id. at 11. 1.
60. See id.
61. See Moritz, supra note 2, at B7 (observing that "[plublic reaction to the newsgroups'
suspension was overwhelmingly negative").
62. See Somm, supra note 4, at 11.1.
63. See id.
2000] 459
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its users elsewhere with continuing access to its newsgroups. The blocking
software, the letter noted, "allow[ed] CompuServe to take youth protection
seriously and simultaneously to re-open most of the temporarily blocked
newsgroups,"65 and therefore to satisfy the legitimate demands of both
German law and CompuServe's non-German customers.
Shortly after the newsgroups were reopened, investigators again
discovered that material prohibited by German law was accessible to
Germans through the CompuServe network.66 In late February 1996, the
Regional Court for the District of Munich 1 notified Somm that he was still
providing access to material then prohibited by two sections of the Penal
Code67 and by the Act on the Dissemination of Publications Morally Harmful
to Youth.6' Finally, charges were brought against Somm, CompuServe
Germany, and CompuServe USA for "mak[ing] publicly accessible
pornographic writings containing acts of violence, sexual abuse of children
and sex acts between human beings and animals" in violation of two sections
of the German Penal Code.69 Moreover, the Local Court alleged that Somm
had negligently violated the Act on the Dissemination of Publications
Morally Harmful to Youth in making available the war games, which were
listed on an index of banned publications.7"
Since the Local Court did not allege that Somm had published the illegal
material himself, these criminal charges rested on several key legal
assumptions. The Local Court charged Somm as an accomplice to the
criminal act of making available illegal material simply by providing access
to the CompuServe USA network.7 Although the Local Court would find
that "viewed individually, CompuServe Germany and the accused had no
opportunity to exercise influence on the data storage device of CompuServe
USA,' , 72 it nonetheless maintained that Somm and CompuServe intended to
circulate the illegal images.73 As to the illegal games, the Local Court
reasoned that "it was within [Somm's] competence to observe that German






69. Id. at IV. 1.
70. See id. at IV.2.
71. See id. at IV 1.A.3.
72. Id. at IV. 1.B.2.a.
73. See id. at IV. 1.A.3.b.
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care to ensure that no indexed games were offered to customers in
Germany."74
B. Somm 's Defense
At trial, Somm made several arguments in his defense that would appear
to be common sense to anyone with even casual knowledge of the Internet.
First, Somm argued that in immediately requesting that CompuServe USA
block access to the newsgroups in question, he had taken the only steps
towards direct technical control over the illegal images and games that he
could.75 Given Somm's subsequent conviction, it is startling to observe that
the Court agreed with Somm: in the absence of user-based blocking software,
only CompuServe USA could effectively block or limit access to any
newsgroups.76
Somm also argued that he was not the "originator" of the images in
question and that, rather, the information had been posted by third parties.77
In fact, Somm alleged, many of the images and texts identified in the
indiciment were never stored on computers owned by CompuServe Germany
or its parent company. 8 Instead, CompuServe merely provided access to
those images and data which were actually stored, in many cases, in other
computer systems accessible via the Internet.79 In any case, Somm argued,
"in at least 99.9% of all [CompuServe Germany's] traffic data . . . [it]
provided access to lawful content."'
Somm's defense was thus simple and direct: the illegal content was not
created or distributed by Somm, but rather by third parties to the action,
parties over whom Somm had no control.81 Consequently, Somm exercised
what little control over content he could by immediately asking CompuServe
USA to remove the offending material.8 2
As sensible as they were, these arguments did not sway the court. On
the charge that Somm and CompuServe Germany distributed pornographic
material, it did not matter if Somm did not post and was not specifically
74. Id. at IV.2.
75. See id. at V.B.
76. See id. at 11.1.
77. See id. at V.A.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. Id. at V.B.
81. See id. at V.A.
82. See id. at V.C.
20001
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aware of the posting of illegal images; since Somm and CompuServe
Germany were aware that the images were stored in CompuServe USA's
storage space and nonetheless provided access, it was their "intent" that the
images be distributed.83 As to Somm's liability on the charge of distributing
the war games, the Court did not have to allege that Somm actually knew
about the illegal material. Rather, Somm's liability rested on a negligence
standard.84 In the Court's view, "it was within [Somm's] duty of reasonable
care to ensure that no [illegal] games were offered in Germany.""5
Among the possible implications of finding an ISP or one of its officers
criminally liable for acts they could not prevent or meaningfully control, two
are particularly disturbing. On the one hand, the court may have believed
that Somm and CompuServe Germany had more control over the activity of
users on their network than they actually did.86 If this were true, then
Somm's criminal liability would rest on the erroneous assumption that Somm
had personally contributed to the criminal act by his knowing failure to
exercise available controls to regulate the content of the CompuServe
newsserver. On the other hand, if the court did fully recognize that Somm
exercised no control over the acts of individual users, then it was nonetheless
willing to attribute liability without a showing that Somm had personally
committed any fault.87
83. See id. at IV. 1.3.b.
84. See id. at IV.2.A.5.
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. That is, even the court noted that CompuServe Germany "only connects the customers
of CompuServe USA in Germany ...with the parent company." Id. at IV. I.B.2.a.
Moreover, Somm argued that even if he could control the postings of CompuServe users,
"the images and texts identified in the indictment could have been procured in identical
manner via any of the approximately 300 access providers presently operating in Germany."
Id. at V.B. The Court blandly asserted that the accessibility of images from other ISPs was
"of no relevance to the case." Id.
87. This is so because the court found Somm liable even though it agreed that Somm may
have had nothing more than constructive notice of acts taken by third parties. See id. at
IV. 1 .B.2.c.aa.
[Vol. 19
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C. Aftermath of the Somm Case
Naturally, Somm's conviction provoked widespread public concern over
holding ISPs criminally liable for acts taken by users.88 Indeed, the Somm
case created enough alarm to cause at least one ISP to withdraw from the
German market.8 9 In the midst of the Somm prosecution itself, the German
legislature attempted to stave off what was increasingly regarded as an
unwise and unfair prosecution9" by passing an amendment to the Information
and Communications Services Act,91  which regulates German
telecommunications businesses, including ISPs.92 This amendment was
designed to shield service providers like CompuServe and corporate officers
like Somm from criminal or civil liability for acts taken independently by
their users.93
However, the Judge was not moved by this development.94 Although the
amendment to German law apparently contemplates a general lack of the
ability of service providers to block content unpredictably posted by its users,
according to the Local Court of Munich, "[tihe liability of the accused [was
not] limited" by the Act.95
In a gesture as unusual as that of the legislature, the prosecutors in
Somm's case were sufficiently uncomfortable with the nature of the judge's
rationale to appeal the case themselves. 96 As one article notes, "[e]ven
government prosecutors had acknowledged that Somm could not be held
responsible for the illegal material." 97  Somm's appeal was ultimately
88. This was especially alarming to German ISPs, of course. See Cukier, supra note 14,
at 16 (observing that "German Internet executives are wary that federal officials intend
to ... hold ISPs liable" regardless of new laws designed to shield ISPs from liability); see
also Moritz, supra note 2, at B7 (reporting that Somm's "prosecution sent shock waves
through the German high-tech industry").
89. See Cukier, supra note 14, at 16. ("PSINet Germany GmbH will move a significant
portion of its web-hosting business outside of Germany").
90. See generally id.
91. Informations-und Kommunikations dienste-luKDG (Teledienstegesetz [TDG]) art. I, §
5(1) (F.R.G.). This section holds ISPs liable only for that content "which they make
accessible for use." Id.
92. See Moritz, supra note 2, at B7.
93. See Cukier, supra note 14, at 16 ("Germany's Multimedia Act... seeks to protect ISPs
from liability from content they themselves do not host.").
94. In rendering his decision, the judge averred that "there can be nowhere outside the law
on the Internet." Executive Convicted over Internet Porn, supra note 25, at E2.
95. Somm, supra note 4, at IV.I.B.
96. See Prosecutors Appeal German CompuServe Porn Conviction, supra note 1, at 1.
97. Executive Convicted Over Internet Porn, supra note 26, at E2.
20001
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successful; the appeals court "agreed with Somm that he had only provided
German customers with access to the information available on Compuserve
USA servers and could not be considered as an accomplice to the distribution
of illegal materials.""8 Even if the success of Somm's appeal has vindicated
the German law that protects ISPs from liability, however, Somm's case
raises the specter of similar prosecutions in other jurisdictions. As one
commentator noted, "this ruling has swept away much legal certainty for
Internet Service Providers .... ISPs across the globe have every reason to
be nervous and unsure about liability in the future."99
The Somm case illustrates perfectly what might deter ISPs from
operating internationally: in the United States, where the "illegal" games
almost certainly originated, the games are not illegal and may even be
constitutionally protected speech.' Thus, Somm's liability rested on acts,
taken without his knowledge, that were legal where they happened. In the
absence of any international standards to shield ISPs from this unwarranted
liability, the scope of the problem is extensive: across all jurisdictions in the
world where Internet access might exist, any number of forms of sexual,
political, and artistic expression are prohibited by national governments.'0 '
If corporate officers can be held liable whenever third parties post material
that is illegal in some jurisdiction in the world willing to prosecute,
corporations might choose to abandon a market rather than face the cost and
futility of policing the massive amount of information to which they provide
access.0 2 Without legal safeguards for ISPs, differing international standards
for the protection of expression will burden ISPs with a very expensive, and
probably impossible, duty.
98. John Schmertz & Mike Meier, German Appeals Court Reverses Conviction of Former
Compuserve Manager for Allegedly Facilitating Telegraphic Disctirubtion of Pornography
Through Internet, 5 INT'L LAW UPDATE 12 (1999).
99. Moritz, supra note 2, at B7.
100. See discussion infra Part 1II.A.
101. See discussion infra Part III.B.
102. As one Canadian ISP spokesperson suggested, "[t]he average ISP is not able to check
content; it's quite simply not ourjob. We are simply transferring the [information]." Laura
Lyne McMurchie, Proposed Internet Bill Product ofNai've Mind, COMPUTING CANADA, Aug.
17, 1998, at 8. See also Cukier, supra note 14, at 16.
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11. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR
THE PROTECTION OF EXPRESSION
As the Somm case illustrates, the imposition of liability on ISPs for the
communications of individual users is problematic for two reasons. First,
there is a general inability on the part of ISPs to regulate Internet content.
0 3
Second, differing jurisdictional standards for the protection of speech or
expression creates tremendous potential for undeserved criminal and civil
penalties.0 4 That is, although a particular image or text could be considered
protected expression in one jurisdiction, and therefore legal, the same image
or text could be prohibited by law in another jurisdiction.' 5 In the absence
of broad international standards designed to protect ISPs from liability,
service providers could be held liable for the dissemination of prohibited
expression whenever one of its thousands of users posts material that is
censored in any jurisdiction, even if the same material is legal in the user's
own jurisdiction.'06
This problem is hardly imaginary: international legal standards for the
protection of expression vary widely. Given that the Internet possesses no
meaningful national boundaries,0 7 the lowest standards for the protection of
speech are those most likely to create a wide range of illegal expression that
will be of greatest concern to ISPs doing business overseas.0 8 Although
expression receives comparatively broad protection in the United States and
some other Western democracies,0 9 many nations currently prohibit a wide
range of speech." 0
103. See Harmon, supra note 47, at Al.
104. See discussion infra Part III.
105. The Somm case is a good illustration: there, the games that formed part of the basis
of Somm's criminal liability, although illegal in Germany, are not proscribed (and are
probably even protected) by American law. See id.
106. See id.
107. See Harmon, supra note 47, at A l ("[I]n cyberspace, there is no distance between two
points").
108. See Oumarou & Lefort, supra note 48, at 38 (noting that the "monitoring of content...
would require ... at least a lowest common denominator").
109. See discussion infra Part III.A.
110. See discussion infra Part III.B. Even in such nations, however, an issue of content
control arises because of "an increased availability of objectionable material." Kim
Rappaport, In the Wake of Reno v. ACLU: The Continued Struggle in Western Constitutional
Democracies with Internet Censorship and Freedom ofSpeech Online, 13 AM. U. INT'L L.
REv. 765 (1998). Rappaport adds that "[a]s a result, some governments have taken steps to
implement restrictions at the national level. The United States and Germany are the most
notable examples, having sparked a flurry of legislative and legal battles over how to regulate
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A. Internet Service Provider Liability in the United States
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution has been
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court as establishing broad
protections for many forms of speech and individual expression, subject to
certain limitations discussed below. 1 ' The Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that at the core of the First Amendment lies a commitment to the notion
that the government may not prohibit speech based on the content of its
message.1 2 One commentator has argued that this historical protection of
content-based speech reflects the Framers' intention to protect not only
political speech,'13 but other forms of expression since "virtually everything
from comic strips to commercial advertisements to even pornography can
have a political dimension."'' 4
1. General Protections for ISPs
American cases involving the liability of Internet service providers for
information or material posted through its network to the Internet have
generally revolved around issues of copyright infringement 15 or
defamation." 6 In such cases, the consequences are civil and proceed not
from government attempts to restrict speech per se but rather from the
distinct legal principles of copyright infringement".7 and of defamation." 8
Both causes of action seek to compensate aggrieved parties for economic or
this evolving medium." id.
!!l. One e....ent schlar notes that the "Supreie Court has never accepted the view that
the First Amendment prohibits all regulation of expression." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.1.2 (Aspen Law & Business 1997).
112. See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (holding that
content-based regulation of speech "is never permitted.").
113. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, § 11.1.2.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Playboy Enter. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (involving
copyright infringement); Playboy Enter. v. Starware Publishing Corp., 900 F. Supp. 443
(S.D. Fla. 1995) (involving copyright infringement); Central Point Software v. Nugent, 903
F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (involving copyright infringement).
116. See generally Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (involving a
defamation claim against an American ISP for speech initiated by a third party).
117. See generally Playboy Enter. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993); Playboy
Enter. v. Starware Publishing Corp., 900 F. Supp. 443 (S.D. Fla. 1995); Central Point
Software v. Nugent, 903 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. Tex. 1995); Zeran, 129 F.3d 327.
118. See Zeran, 129 F.3d 327.
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personal injury, but do not seek to limit expression based on its political,
sexual, or artistic content. 19
2. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno
One attempt in the United States to regulate Internet speech based on its
content was the Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA").120 The
CDA attempted to regulate, among other things, prurient content that
children might access on the Internet. 21 Failure to remove such material or
to block access would result in civil and criminal penalties. 122
However, in American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") v. Reno,"2 3 the
U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the District Court, which had
struck down the CDA as unconstitutional. 12 4 The District Court had held that
the Act unconstitutionally impinged upon established First Amendment
protections of free speech. 25 In upholding that decision, the Supreme Court
reasoned that limiting Internet content to protect minors would interfere with
constitutionally protected adult communications.
126
The stability of this area of constitutional law was confirmed by the
failure of another attempt by the U.S. government to regulate speech on the
Internet. 127 In October 1998, President Clinton signed a new federal cyber-
censorship law known as the Child Online Protection Act.'28 Although the
ACLU promptly challenged this so-called "CDA II" in a lawsuit named,
appropriately, A CLUv. Reno 11,129 and although the judge issued a temporary
119. See Playboy Enter. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993); Playboy Enter. v.
Starware Publishing Corp., 900 F. Supp. 443 (S.D. Fla. 1995); Central Point Software v.
Nugent, 903 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D. Tex. 1995); Zeran, 129 F.3d 327.
120. See Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1996).
121. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)(1996). This subsection of the CDA made it illegal for
anyone to use an "interactive computer service" to send, among other things, any
"communication that ... depicts or describes ... sexual ... activities or organs." Id.
122. See id.
123. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
124. See id. at 885.
125. See id. at 886.
126. See id. at 876
127. See 47 U.S.C. § 231 (1999).
128. See 47 U.S.C. § 231 (1999). This law would impose civil and criminal penalties on
commercial disseminators of pornographic material who make such material available to
children. See id.
129. 31 F.Supp.2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
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injunction prohibiting the government from enforcing the law,13° the U. S.
Justice Department continues to defend it.
B. Internet Service Provider Liability in Other Countries
Many countries, however, do not provide protections for expression on
the Internet similar to those offered in the United States or, more recently,
Germany. 3 ' First, even among Western democracies, attempts to regulate
Internet content are not uncommon and frequently revolve around notions of
"indecent" expression. 3 ' During the same year as Somm's prosecution, for
example, a bill known as the Internet Child Pornography Prevention Act was
introduced in the Canadian House of Commons.133 The legislation sought to
control Internet content through ISP licensure requirements' 34 and imposed
criminal penalties on those who aided in the dissemination of child
pornography.'35 Again, if ISPs are thought to "disseminate" images by
unknowingly providing access to them, another criminal prosecution
resembling Somm's is not unimaginable.
In many non-western nations, the range of speech subject to official
censorship includes not only sexually oriented expression but also a wide
range of political speech.'36 If the Internet has demonstrated a unique
capacity to promote democracy,'37 governments wishing to suppress political
dissent unsurprisingly turn to regulation of speech on the Internet in order to
control political discourse. 3 ' The following section offers two examples of
such control.
1. The Malaysian Example
The legal regulation of the Internet for political puposes in Malaysi i
an excellent example of the criminalization of Internet speech by national
governments. Late in 1998, state police in Malaysia "set up an Internet unit
130. See id. at 477.
13 1. See discussion supra Part 1II.A.1; see also Rappaport, supra note 110, at 765.
132. Both the original CDA and the so-called "CDA II" represent Congressional attempts
to censor pornography that might be accessible to children on the Internet. See discussion
infra Part III.A.
133. See McMurchie, supra note 102, at 8.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See discussion infra Part III.B.1.
137. See Regardless of Frontiers, supra note 30, at Part B.
138. See discussion infra Parts II.B. 1-III.B.2.
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[under Malaysia's Internal Security Act] 139 to monitor sites and newsgroups
that have been organizing protests against the jailing of the former Deputy
Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim."'' 40 This police unit is also entrusted with
the more ambiguously defined task of guarding against "information and
messages [on the Internet] which could affect public security. ', 14' Although
the government of Malaysia, under the leadership of current Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohamad, 42 has denied political dissenters access to traditional
media,'43 it is less able to control the abundant political discourse appearing
on the Internet; thus, "Malaysians who feel their newspapers and
broadcasters are toeing the government line too much have been turning
increasingly to the Internet for alternative coverage. 144 Naturally, in nations
subject to political instability, the range of political expression viewed as
"affecting" public security could be quite broad. 45
Indeed, Malaysia's net-censorship laws and policing have already
effected the detainment and arrest of several Malaysian citizens "under the
Internal Security Act after an anonymous e-mail warned that migrant workers
from Indonesia were buying machetes as a prelude to riots. 146 These four
citizens, characterized by Prime Minister Mohamad as "worse than
cowards,"' 47 may be held for up to two years without a trial. 48 Interestingly
enough, the government tracked down the political dissenters mostly through
the aid of Malaysian ISPs themselves, who presumably wished to avoid being
accused of having helped to disseminate the rumors. 49 The risk of future
criminal prosecutions is only increased by the great volume of political
dissent now circulated via the Internet: the newsgroups and web pages in
question were not simply "disseminator[s] of information" but acted as






143. See Chris Nuttal, Malaysians Take to Web in Anwar Protest, BBC ONLINE, (visited
Oct. 27, 1999) <http://news2.thls.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_181000/181991 .stm>.
144. Nuttal, supra note 139.
145. This is especially the case with political dissent, which could merely be the expression
of political opinion adverse to the government.
146. Nuttal, supra note 139.
147. Chris Nuttal, Malaysia Arrests Net Newsgroup Suspects, BBC NEWS ONLINE (visited
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"campaign organiser" as well.15° In response, the Inspector General of Police
promised that "more arrests were imminent."''
2. The Chinese Example
In recent years, China has experienced a rapid expansion in its number
of Internet users. Some reports indicate that the number of Internet users in
China surpassed 1.18 million in the first six months of 1998."5' As in other
nations, the Internet has become an engine for the dissemination of political
views in China.5 3 Increasingly sensitive to and uncomfortable with the
Internet's great potential to spread dissent, "Chinese police departments
[have been] given the authority to monitor how individuals are using the
Net." 5 4 For example, "a recent order has been released by the police and the
Ministry of Culture's National Commercial Administration for tighter checks
on China's growing number of Internet cafes."' 55 By such legal action, the
Chinese government is making concerted attempts to temper the increasing
popularity of the Internet with sober warnings against fulminating political
dissent: "[t]he order emphasized that Internet cafes were not allowed to
engage in activities endangering state security or social stability, or criminal
activities."' 156 Such hostility to political speech on the Internet has resulted
in the prosecution of one Chinese intellectual for the commission of crimes
"aimed at subverting state political power."' 57 Other such prosecutions are
far from unlikely.'58
Political dissent is not the only concern of the Chinese government. The
recently outlawed Falun Gong religious sect has turned to the Internet to
150. See Nuttal, supra note 139.
151. Nuttal Ill, supra note 147.
152. See China 1.18 Million Surf Internet, supra note 25, at 1.
153. For example, China-based websites are frequently the source of "anti-American
lashings and criticisms of Chinese leadership." Choo Li Meng, Chinese Let Views Fly on
Internet, STRAITS TIMEs (Singapore), July 1, 1999, at 40.
154. Chinese Police to Patrol the Net, NEWMEDIA CANADA, Jan. 26, 1999.
155. China Warns Cybercafes Against Endangering State Security, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE,
Jan. 30, 1999.
156. Id.
157. Chinese Intellectual Detainedfor Alleged Internet Crimes, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Sept.
3, 1999.
158. Indeed, a recent circular distributed by Chinese police calls for "a crackdown on
'hostile elements' using the internet to foment political unrest." Chinese Police Circular
Calls for Crackdown on Internet Dissent, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Sept. 1, 1999.
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"spread rumors based on information in... ill-gotten state documents."' 5 9
The police have actively investigated a number of such cases.' 60 In fact,
much as in Malaysia, the Chinese government has even begun to use the
Internet itself to combat members of the sect, blocking or penetrating Falun
Gong websites.' 6' As the targeting of cybercafes and the Falun Gong sect
demonstrate, with growing Chinese Internet use, the opportunity for ISPs to
offend laws prohibiting political or other speech only increases.
C. International Agreements Protecting Expression
An apparent solution to the problem of transnational ISP liability for
third-party acts lies in simply utilizing the broad language of certain human
rights instruments aimed at protecting self-expression in order to constrict the
range of criminally punishable expression. 162 At least three inadequacies
arise with this solution, however. First, even under the terms of international
agreements, a state would be able to restrict a wide range of speech pursuant
to its police power, provided that it could claim that the expression imposed
some danger to the health or welfare of its citizens. 163 Second, international
instruments protecting fireedom of expression do not generally have the status
of binding law because they embody normative ideals' " and establish limited
enforcement mechanisms, if any.'65 Finally, and most simply, not all nations
are signatory to these international accords.
159. Falun Gong Followers Leak State Secrets, XiNHUANEws AGENCY, Oct. 25, 1999, at
I.
160. See id.
161. See China's War with Falun Gong Goes to Net, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 1999 at A 14.
162. This section will discuss several of these international agreements and the relative
protections they afford.
163. As will be discussed below, each of the agreements described in this section, in fact,
leaves room for state regulation of expression in the name of protecting the public health and
welfare. See discussion infra Parts III.C.1-111.C.3.
164. See Regardless of Frontiers, supra note 30, at A.
165. See id.
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1. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR"), adopted in
1948 by the United Nations, 166 broadly proclaims freedom of expression for
signatory States. Article 19 of the UDHR states: "Everyone has the right to
freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information
and ideas through any medium regardless of frontiers." '67
Article 12 further provides that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.1 68
Opponents of excessive government regulation of speech on the Internet have
pointed to the "through any medium" language to emphasize that the broad
standards established by the Declaration were intended to provide protection
for new media that signatory nations could not have anticipated at the time
the Declaration was adopted. 1
69
Despite its broad language, the UDHR recognizes some exceptions to
the basic protection of expression it was intended to promote.17 ° For
example, Article 29(2) provides that the protection of public welfare is a
legitimate reason to limit expression.' 7' The protections of the UDHR are
therefore subordinated to a state's police power to protect "morality, public
order, and the general welfare. 172 These categories are vast, however, and
their breadth allows a wide range of opinion on what exactly "protection" of
"morality" and "public order" would mean. Moreover, the line between
protection of morality and impermissible regulation of public opinion is
unclear at best,'73 and a genuine question exists as to whether it is at all
necessary for a State to control expression in order to protect morality.
Despite the wide recognition of the UDHR internationally, the UDHR
is not a treaty and, as such, does not have the force of law. 174 However, over
166. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. res. 217A (111),
U.N. Doc A/810 at 71.
167. Id. at art. 19.
168. Id.
169. See Regardless of Frontiers, supra note 30, at A. 1.
170. As the text following will explain, the treaty leaves room for control of speech and
expression as a function of the state's exercise of its police power.
171. See UDHR, supra note 166, at art. 29(2).
172. Id.
173. Consider the Malaysian example: spreading rumors of rioting arguably undermines
public order, but also may play an important role as a political voice. See discussion supra
Part IlI.B. 1.
174. See Regardless of Frontiers, supra note 30, at A. 1.
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time the UDHR has become a normative instrument175 and has created
certain limited legal obligations for member states. It has been incorporated
by law into the jurisprudence of member nations in two ways. First, evidence
of consensus of opinion and practice exists for many member states 176 whose
courts and legislatures have broadly incorporated the principles embodied in
the UDHR into their own laws. 17 7 Secondly, the language and ideological
thrust of the UDHR has been incorporated into subsequent treaties, some of
which are outlined below.
78
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR")
expands upon the principles first established through the UDHR. The ICCPR
echoes the UDHR's Article 19 protection of expression, declaring that
"[e]veryone shall have the right to hold opinions without
interference . . . [and to] freedom of expression."'' 7 9 Somewhat more
explicitly than the UDHR, the ICCPR extends protection of expression to all
forms of media: "[t]his right shall include freedom to seek, receive, and
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other
media."'80 Clearly, then, the ICCPR is also aimed at hindering government
control over the circulation of "information," a category broad enough to
protect expression such as the Internet encourages.18
Like UDHR, the ICCPR also recognizes certain limitations on individual
expression. Article 19(3) of the ICCPR provides that restrictions on freedom
of expression are valid if they are "provided by law and are necessary (a) For
respect of the rights or reputation of others; [or] (b) For the protection of
national security or of public order, or of public health or morals.' 82 Again,
while protection of speech in every legal regime has been limited at least by
reservation of a police power to the state, the categories of "public order,...




178. See discussion infra Parts III.C.2-II.C.4.
179. United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
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infringement upon expression that is all to easily deemed "harmful" in some
way.
Under the ICCPR, signatory states are required to submit periodical
reports demonstrating that they have taken measures to protect and advance
certain enumerated human rights, one of which is freedom of expression.'83
A Human Rights Committee reviews these reports, identifies possible
violations of the covenant, and recommends solutions through advisory
opinions.
114
Enforcement of the ICCPR is likely to be inconsistent at best.'85 States
could easily omit from their reports certain information likely to serve as the
basis for a determination by the Committee that rights have been violated.
Even private causes of action pursued under the covenant do not bring every
violation to the Committee's attention since private remedies must first by
exhausted by the party in question.'86 Finally, the greatest obstacle to
enforcement of the ICCPR lies in its optional status. 87  The advisory
opinions of the Committee, like those of many international bodies, are just
that-advisory- and the Committee lacks significant enforcement power.1
8
3. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Political Rights
The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
("ICESCR") echoes the language of the UDHR in recognizing the important
"benefits to be derived from the encouragement and development of
international contacts and cooperation in the scientific and cultural fields."'
189
However, like the UDHR and the ICCPR, the ICESCR establishes only a
review system, not an enforcement power, for any expression it protects. 90
183. See ICCPR, supra note 179, at art. 40, § 1.
184. See id. at § 2.
185. See id. Advocates of free expression online have noted that the international
patchwork of treaties protecting speech leave holes in which national governments could
expansively control online speech and expression by way of its police power. See Regardless
of Frontiers, supra note 30, at A.2. See also ICCPR, supra note 179.
186. See ICCPR, supra note 179, at 15-16.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 15.
189. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 1976 U.N.T.S. No.
14531, vol. 993, 3, art. 15.4.
190. See id. at art. 17.1.
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4. Adequate Protection for Internet Service Providers Doing Business
Overseas?
Despite the strong language of these international accords for the
protection of expression, their enforceability is a major limitation.1 91 At best,
so far the agreements have offered normative ideals, not enforceable
standards,' 92 and have been effective only insofar as courts and legislatures
have taken it upon themselves to incorporate those standards into their
national law.' 93 Moreover, all of the accords recognize a fairly broad police
power on the part of the state to regulate expression considered harmful to
members of the community, especially children.'94
Thus, although these agreements evidence an international impulse to
protect a broad range of expression, their usefulness is mitigated by three
basic limitations. First, each one of the international agreements
contemplates state regulation of expression on the Internet through the
exercise of the state's police power.'95 Since there is arguably no logical
limit on what types of speech could in some way affect public morality or
political opinion, such police power could be exercised expansively. Second,
these international agreements do not create vigorous enforcement
mechanisms. 196 Third, in practical terms, it is very unlikely that all nations
in which ISPs wish to do business, even western democratic ones, will
altogether abandon attempts to control the type of expression to which their
citizens have access.'9 7 In short, then, international accords might
successfully reduce the risk of unwarranted ISP liability as willing nations
incorporate the principles of the agreements into their own national law. But
it is unlikely, given the limitations described above, that the agreements
themselves could ever establish blanket protections for ISPs facing potential
criminal liability for acts taken by third parties over whom ISPs have no
control. 198
19 1. See generally Regardless of Frontiers, supra note 30, at D.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See discussion supra Parts III.C.l-II.C.4.
195. All of them, that is, reserve some room for a nation's police power, but do not help
define what, in the view of the framers of these documents, is a legitimate exercise of that
power. See discussion supra Parts I11I.C. I-III.C.4.
196. See id
197. The United States itself, for example, attempted a second Internet pornography bill
even after the first had fallen to serious constitutional infirmities. See 47 U.S.C. § 23 1
(1999). See also discussion supra Part IlI.A.2.
198. This is due to the many enforcement problems elucidated above. See discussion supra
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IV. THE UNIQUE NATURE OF COMMUNICATION ON THE INTERNET AND
RESULTING PROBLEMS OF CONTENT CONTROL
Because of the global reach of the Intemet,' 99 ISPs typically lack control
over and notice of illegal material stored on their networks.00 Again, this
lack of notice is not likely to arise from the deliberate failure of ISPs to
screen their networks from expression that is illegal in the jurisdictions in
which they operate. Rather, the difficulty arises out of the lack of meaningful
geographical and jurisdictional boundaries on the Internet that makes such
screening impossible. z1
The content of the Internet is created by users in nearly every part of the
globe.20 2 An anonymous user in one jurisdiction could post an image to a
network based in another jurisdiction, which itself gets Internet access from
another, larger service provider in yet another jurisdiction.0 3 In any one of
these jurisdictions, the image might be illegal, and if so, the temporary
storage of the image on the storage device of any of the ISPs could lead to
prosecution.
Indeed, this is what happened in the Somm case, where some of the
images used to form the basis of the charges against Somm were not even
stored on the proprietary servers of CompuServe USA, but were merely
accessible to German CompuServe users through CompuServe's provision
of general Internet access.20 4 However, despite the difficulty of convincingly
alleging that ISPs themselves have broken the law when they have merely
provided access to the Internet itself, nations can and do impose criminal
liability on ISPs for certain types of illegal content appearing on their
networks.2" 5
Moreover, although it is part of a domestic corporation's duty of due
diligence to investigate and obey the laws of foreign jurisdictions,2 °6 the
possluility that attonymous users could post illegal material on a network
accessible from anywhere in the world makes it nearly impossible that ISPs
Parts III.C.1-III.C.4.
199. See Harmon, supra note 47, at Al.
200. See Moritz, supra note 2, at B7.
201. See Harmon, supra note 47, at Al.
202. See id.
203. See Somm, supra note 4, at V.A.
204. See id.
205. See generally discussion supra Parts 171.A-11.B.
206. According to the Local Court, Somm had a duty to exercise reasonable diligence in
avoiding infractions of the law through CompuServe Germany. See Somm, supra note 4, at
IV.2.A.5.
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could know, on a day-to-day basis, the exact content of their networks, illegal
or not.2°7 There would thus be little opportunity for ISPs to comply with the
laws of foreign jurisdictions with respect to restricted content. Given all of
the above, transnational service providers face certain predictable difficulties:
(1) ISPs will not be able to police their own networks to prevent
themselves from incurring civil or criminal liability for illegal
content;
(2) Such policing, even if technically feasible, would be too
financially burdensome for ISPs to continue to provide Internet
access in foreign jurisdictions; and therefore
(3) Transnational ISPs doing business overseas will be unable to
indemnify their officers from criminal and civil liability in foreign
jurisdictions in the absence of an international agreement either:
(i) removing restrictions on content on the Internet;208 or
(ii) universally limiting the liability of service providers
for the acts of third parties.
Clearly, until these inadequacies in current international law are addressed,
transnational ISPs will continue to face uncertainty and possibly even
criminal liability for acts taken by parties over whom those ISPs have no
control.
V. CONCLUSION
There is a clear need for a multilateral treaty which would establish
appropriate protections for ISPs from criminal liability arising from acts
taken by third-party users.20 9 Only such protections would make it possible
for an ISP to do business in a foreign jurisdiction that criminalizes certain
forms of expression without itself being unpredictably exposed to criminal
liability. Although the excesses of the Somm decision were corrected on
appeal,2t 0 the case nonetheless raises the specter of criminal prosecutions in
otherjurisdictions. Far from remaining the concern only of civil libertarians,
the question of ISP liability in a world of differing standards for the
protection of speech vitally affects the viability of the Internet as a global
207. Such a lack of knowledge did not, of course, prevent the court in Somm from finding
that the accused intended to distribute the banned content to German CompuServe users. See
Somm, supra note 4, at IV. 1.3.b.
208. Such a solution is unlikely at best. See discussion supra Part III.C.4.
209. No such treaty currently exists. See discussion supra Part III.
210. See Schmertz & Meier, supra note 98, at 12.
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marketplace without borders. The resolution of this question will help
determine the real cost of doing business for the large, transnational ISPs that
constitute the bedrock of this marketplace.2 1' If the Internet itself is a truly
global network, protecting ISPs from undeserved liability will require a
global solution.
Mark Konkel
211. "Internet Service Providers have proliferated at a breathtaking pace.... Between mid-
1995 and mid-1996, five million servers were created." Oumarou & Lefort, supra note 48,
at 38.
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